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Abstract
This paper is a first step in the analysis of the use of signals of taxpayer’s incomes by tax
audit authorities. In a very simple model, we consider the design of the audit strategy
when the tax authority can commit to it and has free access to a signal correlated with the
taxpayer’s true income. We discuss the optimal enforcement policy and compare it with
the optimal one when only self-reported income is considered. Our main result is that the
well-known regressive bias of revenue-maximizing audit rules may be convert in a
progressive one when signals are used.
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1.- INTRODUCTION
Reducing the income tax gap - the difference between actual income taxes owed
and those voluntary paid - and maintaining high levels of compliance are among the
biggest challenges for tax authorities.
1 In order to reduce noncompliance, tax authorities
design audit strategies. Taxpayers' returns that, when audited, are discovered to be
fraudulent suffer a penalty in addition to the taxes owed. This mechanism increases the
compliance both directly (the collection effect) and indirectly (through the dissuasion
effect). Obviously, the most important aspect of the design of audit strategies is how to
select taxpayers. Audit strategies can be based in random selection, but in general some
data are used to direct this selection in order to screen for returns that have a higher
potential audit revenue.
The theoretical literature has hitherto devoted attention to the self-reported income
as the main element for the audit selection.
2 However, in practice, tax authorities have
access to (potentially) hundreds of different information sources pertaining to the
transactions and consumption of taxpayers. Accordingly, the challenge in designing a
useful audit strategy is to know how to use this information in a useful and manageable
way. This paper is a first step in this direction.
We consider a simple model in which the tax administration has access to statistical
information, that we refer to as a signal, correlated with the taxpayer’s true income. We
analyze the use of this signal as a deterrent device. As expected, informative signals will
always be used. We show how the signal is used and show that audit signals may convert
the regressive bias, that is a well-known characteristic of revenue-maximizing audit rules,
into a progressive bias.
In our knowledge, only Scotchmer (1987) has previously dealt with this issue. In
her model she considers the use of taxpayer characteristics known to the taxpayers (such
                                               
1 The IRS estimates that taxpayers fail to voluntary pay in excess of $100 billion annually in taxes
due to income from legal sources. IRS' data for 1992 suggest that taxpayers voluntary pay 83
percent of the income taxes owed - 87 percent after enforcement (General Account Office, 1995a).
2 See Cowell (1990) for a general analysis of the economics of tax evasion, and  Andreoni, Erard,
and Feinstein (1998) for a recent review of the literature on tax compliance.3
as age, sex or occupation).
3 She proves that the use of such signals, that allows the tax
authority to divide taxpayers in audit classes, tend to promote vertical equity at the cost of
reducing horizontal equity.
Here we take the view that, within an audit class, the tax audit authority has access
to lots of information other than the self-reported income that can be valuable to select
individuals for audit. We resume this information in a single random variable correlated to
the true income and assume that the realization of this random variable is not known to the
taxpayer. To motivate this modelization choice, let us note that in practice, tax
administrations tend to adopt a statistical approach to the problem of how to use the
information at hand, as manifested in the DIF score method used in the USA.
4 Other
countries follow a similar practice. One reason for summarizing the information (in our
case in one single signal) is related to cost containment and manageability arguments.
Another advantage of using aggregate information instead of the information from each
source is related to the fact that as taxpayers become aware of the criteria used by the tax
administration, they tend to modify their behavior strategically. The use of an aggregated
signal can be understood as a try to handle this behavior by hiding the exact equation that
generates the statistical score. In other words, using the information about different items
in an aggregate way avoids inducing distortions in taxpayers’ behavior among these
                                               
3 The compliance rate seems to be very different across occupations, for example. The Taxpayer
Compliance Measurement Program (US-IRS, 1983) estimates that in 1981 tax compliance was
93.9% for wages and salaries, 86.3% for interest, 83.7% for dividends, 61.2% for royalties, 59.4%
for capital gains, 50.3% for non-farm proprietors, 47.0% for small businesses, 37.2% for rents,
20.7% for informal suppliers, and -18% for farmers. This is the reason why certain professions are
more targeted for audit.
4 The IRS audit strategy establishes about 40 audit sources, which are programs and techniques
used to select potentially non-compliant returns. Audit sources include, among others, suspected
tax shelters and IRS and non-IRS referrals. The discriminant index function (DIF) is one of the
majors tools to audit.  It is a computer generated score designed to predict returns most likely to
result in additional taxes owed if audited (General Account Office, 1998). Two-thirds of audited
tax returns are picked by IRS computers using the DIF. Other audits are selected through referrals
from state and local governments, from criminal cases and by special enforcement programs
(Anderson, 1999).4
items.
5 The only information that taxpayers have is that their true income is correlated to
the realization of the signal.
There are some empirical analyses that support the existence and the use of signals
in tax auditing. Alm, Bahl, and Murray (1993) estimate a model of audit selection and
income tax evasion in Jamaica. Their results strongly support the systematic nature of the
tax authority behavior, "as illustrated by the variety of reported items that influence the
probability of an audit". More recently, Erard and Feinstein (1994), after dividing the
taxpayers' population by income sources, allow for the possibility that the tax authority,
before the audit decision, observes a signal of the taxpayer's evasion that is not recorded in
the data. Their results indicate that the IRS "does appear to possess information that is
correlated with evasion behavior and not derived from tax returns."
To be more precise, we consider a tax authority allocating resources in an attempt
to identify the taxpayers who underreport and to increase voluntary compliance. The audit
strategy takes into account both the income tax return and a signal related to the
taxpayer's true income level. We assume that the tax authority can commit to any pre-
specified audit policy (the principal-agent approach), and look for the optimal audit policy
(for an audit class). For simplicity, we assume that signals are free. Moreover, we develop
the analysis for a situation in which three income levels are possible. We obtain the
optimal audit schedule for each possible budget size, the informational content of the pre-
audit information, and the parameters of the distribution of incomes.
For a given report, the optimal auditing policy involves directing the auditing first
to those taxpayers whose signal is more indicative of high income. Clearly, auditing “high-
signal taxpayers” is optimal ex-post, i.e., once the reports have been made. The interest of
our result is that we prove that it is also optimal to announce this property ex-ante.
                                               
5 For example, imagine that the fact that taxpayers report a variety of lines items is taken into
account. Martinez-Vazquez and Rider (1995) consider the effect of different exogenous audit
policies contingent to the different line items report, and estimate a model of tax evasion in which
taxpayers choose how much to report in each line item. They find that the evasion in one mode
depends on the possibilities for evasion on the other modes, in a similar way as a consumer decides
on the diversification of its portfolio. However, in the taxpayers choice problem, the risk associated
to the different items depend on the audit policy. Hence, to be very specific on the way the
information will be used for audit will induce an important distortion in the taxpayer behavior.5
The optimal policy in our framework shares two characteristics with the policy that
is optimal when no signal is available. First, auditing pressure over any taxpayer is
decreasing with the reported income. Second, the income reported is not decreasing with
true income. That is, higher income levels cannot lead to lower reports.
On the other hand, our results contrast with the previous literature in two aspects.
First, the actual auditing probabilities can be increasing with the income. Although the
probability of auditing (high signals) does not increase with the reported income, as in the
previous models, the auditing pressure (for a given report) is increasing in the income.
When the second effect is stronger than the first one, the tax administration audits more
often taxpayers with higher income.
 Second and more important, the conclusion that revenue-maximizing income
rules, within an income class, lead to more regressive effective taxes than the nominal
taxes can be converted.
6 Our analysis shows that when the tax authority directs the audit
using signals about taxpayers’ true income, it may be the case that effective taxes are more
progressive than nominal ones. The use of signals is worthy not only because it makes the
audits more effective, but also because it can reduce the regressive bias associated with the
possibility of fraud.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model. Then, in
Section 3, we analyze the taxpayer behavior for any audit schedule. In Section 4, we
obtain some characteristics of the optimal policy. In Section 5, we study the optimal audit
policy for the tax authority as a function of the budget, the informational content of the
signal, and some characteristics of the income distribution. The relation between auditing
and progressivity of the effective taxes is discussed in Section 6. Section 7 concludes. The
proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
                                               
6 See, e.g., Chandler and Wilde (1998), Cremer et al (1990) and Sánchez and Sobel (1993).
Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo (1997) obtain the same result in a model with several audit
classes where the main difference between audit classes is the probability that a taxpayer's true
income is discovered when audited. As mentioned before, a notable exception is Scotchmer (1987)
who proves that progressibity can be improved across audit classes. We comment on this paper at
length in Section 6.6
2.- THE MODEL
There exists a continuum of taxpayers characterized by their true tax liability i. The
true tax liability i can take three different values, i ˛ {0, m, 1}, i.e., we normalize the tax
liability of the lower income level to zero, the high income liability to 1, and m ˛ (0, 1).
7
The tax authority knows the distribution of tax liability, but it does not know the true tax
liability of each particular taxpayer.
Taxpayers fill a tax return and pay the income tax liability corresponding to the
return. We will denote a taxpayer’s reported tax liability by r. If a taxpayer is audited, and
his/her true income is discovered, he/she has to pay the evaded tax liability (if any), (i – r).
On top of the tax due, an evader must pay a penalty. We assume that the marginal penalty
rate is constant, i.e., penalties equal p times the level of tax evasion.
Taxpayers are risk neutral. They choose how much income to report in order to
maximize their expected net income. Under risk neutrality this is equivalent to saying
that taxpayers minimize their expected payment. We denote by r(i) the report made by a
taxpayer with true tax liability i, r(i) ˛ {0, m, 1}. We take the convention that a taxpayer
sends the highest report among the ones between which he/she is indifferent.
The tax authority maximizes the revenue collected through taxes and penalties,
for a given budget B. The tax authority can send officials to audit a taxpayer. We
suppose that this audit is so effective that it finds out the true tax liability of the taxpayer
in a verifiable way.
8 We denote by c > 0 the cost of auditing one taxpayer. To select
returns for audit, the tax authority can use non-verifiable signals about the taxpayer’s
true income. We assume that this signal is costless.
9 The signal can take two values, s ˛
                                               
7 In other words, if y represents the true income and t(.) is the tax function, i = t(y). Note that we do
not make any assumption on the shape of the tax function.
8 This is the audit technique that is typically considered in the literature on tax auditing, see, for
example, Sánchez and Sobel (1993). See also Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo (1997) for a
departure from this assumption.
9 Similarly, we could assume that the observation of a signal implies mainly a (not too large) fixed
cost, independent of the number of audits (like buying a computer to deal with the data).7
{d, u}, where d stands for "down" and u stands for "up". The probability of the
realization of the signal depends upon the true income of the taxpayer:
Prob(s = u | i) = ai .
We assume a0 £ am £ a1. This guarantees that the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property is
satisfied. When a0 < am < a1 the signal is positively correlated with the income, so that a
higher probability of the "high" (up) signal corresponds to higher tax liability. For a0 = am
= a1 the signal is uninformative. Finally, note that even if for example a0 = 0 and a1 = 1,
the signal is very useful to allow the auditor to identify low-income taxpayers and high-
income taxpayers, but an audit is still necessary to provide the evidence.
The tax authority chooses the auditing function, which depends on the taxpayer’s
reported income r and the signal received s. We assume that the tax authority can commit
to this probability-of-audit function. Let us denote it by prs.
3.- THE TAXPAYERS’ BEHAVIOR
We analyze now the taxpayers’ behavior depending on the audit function. In order
to decide whether to report truthfully or to understate their income (there are no bonuses
for over-reporting), taxpayers minimize the expected taxes and fines to be paid. Let r(i) be
the report function. For convenience, we denote p(i, r) ” (1–ai) prd + ai pru the auditing
pressure on a taxpayer earning income i who reports r. Notice that the behavior of a
taxpayer with income i, the expected taxes, and the auditing costs depend on prd and pru
only through p(i, r).
A taxpayer with true tax liability i = 0 does not have any possibility for under-
reporting, therefore he/she always reports r(0) = 0.
A taxpayer with tax liability i = m has only one possible underreporting strategy: to
report r = 0. He/she reports truthfully (i.e., r(m) = m) if and only if:
m £ p(m, 0) (1+p) m  ￿   p(m, 0) ‡ 1/(1+p).
(1)
Otherwise, he/she reports r(m) = 0.8
A taxpayer with tax liability i = 1 has two underreporting strategies. He/she can
choose r = m or r = 0. He/she prefers reporting r = 1 than r = 0 if the payment when
reporting his/her true rent is lower or equal than his/her expected payment when reporting
r = 0, that is, if
1 £ p(1, 0) (1+p)    ￿   p(1, 0) ‡ 1/(1+p). (2)
Similarly, the high-income taxpayer prefers reporting r = 1 to r = m if and only if:
p(1, m) ‡ 1/(1+p). (3)
Finally, a taxpayer with tax liability i = 1 reports r = m rather than r = 0 if and only
if:
m + p(1, m) (1+p) (1 – m) £ p(1, 0) (1+p). (4)
Remark that if 1/(1+p) £ p(1, r), then a high-income taxpayer will not report r < 1.
An important feature due to the existence of signals is that the enforcement
pressure perceived by a taxpayer does not only depend on the audit policy, but also on
his/her true income level. Two taxpayers with different true income facing the same audit
probabilities pru and prd perceive different audit pressure when they report r. More
precisely, for pru > prd, p(i, r) is increasing in i. Moreover, the difference in the perception
of the two taxpayers increases with the informational content of the signal (i.e., with ai).
The previous feature also implies that changes in the audit policy affect the taxpayers'
behavior differently depending on their true income.
4.- SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ENFORCEMENT POLICY
We now derive some characteristics of the optimal enforcement policy. Note that
auditing a high report is a waste of resources. Therefore, we look for the optimal auditing
strategy when the report is either r = m or r = 0.
The proof of the next three lemmas is given in the Appendix. The first two lemmas
generalize properties that are satisfied for the optimal auditing policy when signals are not
available.9
Lemma 1. When looking for the optimal auditing policy, there is no loss of generality in
restricting the analysis to audit functions that satisfy:
(i) p(1, m) £ 1/(1+p) ,     and
(ii) Min {p(1, 0), p(m, 0)} £ 1/(1+p).
Lemma 1 sets upper bounds to the audit probabilities in optimal auditing policies.
For example, in (i), since an enforcement pressure that satisfies p(1, m) = 1/(1+p) induces
high-income taxpayers not to report r = m, setting the pressure above this level is a waste
of resources. Similarly, a policy that satisfies the equation in (ii) with equality suffices to
ensure that high and medium-income taxpayers do not report r = 0.
Lemma 2. When looking for the optimal auditing policy, there is no loss of generality in
restricting the analysis to audit functions that satisfy:  p(1, m) £ p(1, 0).
Lemma 2 states that the global enforcement pressure over taxpayers reporting r =
0 cannot be inferior to the one exerted over taxpayers reporting r = m. It gives us some
kind of non-decreasing property of the audit policy on the reports. This characteristic is
common in adverse selection problems since the most profitable deviation is to report the
lower income level.
The following lemma provides a very intuitive property of the optimal enforcement
policy when signals are available: it is optimal to start auditing the taxpayers whose signal
is “up”, before spending resources in auditing taxpayers whose signal is “down”.
Lemma 3. When looking for the optimal auditing policy, there is no loss of generality in
restricting the analysis to audit functions that satisfy:
pid > 0   only if   piu = 1,  for i = 0, m.
One important consequence of Lemma 3 is that, since the signal “up” appears with
higher probability the higher the true income is, the auditing pressure is increasing with
income. In particular, note that r(1) = 0 only if r(m) = 0. Therefore, the report is
increasing with the true income.
From now on, for simplicity of exposition we will concentrate on a particular
example concerning the distribution of the population of taxpayers and the probabilities of10
receiving the signal “up”. Also for simplicity of exposition, we will assume that the penalty
rate is high enough. For more general forms, the qualitative results remain unchanged, but
the expressions become cumbersome.
Assumption 1. (i) The distribution of the population is uniform. (ii) a0 = (1–a), am =1/2,
and a1 = a, with a ˛ [1/2, 1]. (iii) p ‡ 1.
Let us explain (iii) in Assumption 1. By Lemma 3, if pmd > 0 then pmu = 1 and
therefore p(1, m) = (1–a) pmd + a pmu = (1–a) pmd + a > a ‡ 1/2. Suppose now that p ‡
1. Then 1/(1+p) £ 1/2. We can conclude that p(1, m) = (1–a) pmd + a pmu > 1/(1+p),
which contradicts (i) of Lemma 1. Therefore, p ‡ 1 implies that pmd = 0. Similarly, if p0d >
0 and p ‡ 1, then we obtain a contradiction of (ii) of Lemma 1. To sum up, p ‡ 1 implies
p0d = pmd = 0. This allows us to concentrate on the decision on p0u and pmu.
Using Assumption 1 and the previous results, we can simplify the expressions
concerning the taxpayers’ reporting behavior:
r(m) = m   if  p0u ‡
2
1+ p
. Otherwise, r(m) = 0. (5)
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m + pmu(1- m).
10 (8)
5.- TAX COMPLIANCE AND OPTIMAL ENFORCEMENT
Anticipating the optimal taxpayer behavior for any audit policy, the tax authority
decides the optimal audit schedule. We solve this decision problem in two steps. First, we
fix a specific profile of taxpayer behavior (for instance, r(m) = m, r(1) = m) and we11
identify the optimal audit policy sustaining this profile given the budget B. The second step
consists in comparing the tax authority revenue in each profile of taxpayers' behavior and
identifying the optimal audit policy as a function of the available budget.
In our model, the relevant taxpayers’ behavior profiles are the following:
(i) Full non-compliance: r(m) = 0, r(1) = 0. We will refer to it as Profile A.
(ii) Low Compliance: r(m) = 0, r(1) = m. Profile B.
(iii) Only high-income taxpayers evade: r(m) = m, r(1) = m. Profile C.
(iv) Only medium-income taxpayers evade: r(m) = 0, r(1) = 1. Profile D.
(v) Full compliance: r(m) = m, r(1) = 1. Profile E.
In principle, there is another possible profile: the case with r(m) = m  and r(1) = 0.
But, as we have discussed after Lemma 3, this is never possible.
It is not always possible to achieve a certain taxpayers’ behavior. For example,
suppose that we analyze a profile where the high income taxpayers do not report r = 0.
Then, the probability p0u must be higher than m/a(1+p). Moreover, at least the low
income taxpayers are reporting r = 0. Therefore, a minimum budget is necessary to induce
this pattern of taxpayers’ behavior.
Lemma 4 states the minimum budget that is necessary to implement each possible
profile of behavior. It also compares the different values of the minimum budgets. Since all
the enforcement parameters enter in the same way in the revenue function, for
convenience, we denote b = (B/c) (1+p). An increase in b can be interpreted as an increase
in the budget B, a decrease in the audit cost c, or an increase in the penalty associated to
evasion p. We will refer to b as “the enforcement strength”. We denote by bP the minimum
enforcement strength necessary to induce the taxpayers to adopt a behavior profile P.
Lemma  4.
                                                                                                                                           
10 Note that it is not necessary to check the constraint p0u < 1 / a (1+p), since it is immediately
satisfied when pmu £ 1 / a (1+p), which always holds by Lemma 1 (i).12
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(i) bE > bD > bC > bA, and bD > bB > bA for a  ˛ ]1/2,1[.





(iv) bE = bD  for a = 1/2 and a = 1; and  bC = 0  for a = 1.
Note, first, that the minimum enforcement strength that allows the tax authority to
reach the different profiles is decreasing in a. This characteristic is easy to understand: the
more informative the signal is, the more effective is the audit. Note also that the minimum
enforcement needed to reach a profile is independent of the tax liability m except for
Profile B. This is so because the probability that induces high income taxpayers to report
r(1) = m and not r(1) = 0 depends on the level of m.
Next lemma states the optimal audit policy for each possible profile of behavior,
when the budget allows to implement such a taxpayers’ behavior.
Lemma  5. The optimal audit policy in each profile is:
Profile A (r(m) = 0, r(1) = 0): p0u = 2 B/c and  pmu =0.
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(b) If m ‡
3 - 2a
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11 Notice that 4a (1–a) / (3 – 2a) is always inferior to (3 – 2a) / (4 – 2a) for a  ˛ [1/2,1].13











Notice that Profile B has two sub-profiles depending on the comparison between m
and a function of a.
12  The reason is that, in this case, the tax authority can decide either
to audit only reports r = 0 or to audit both reports, r = 0 and r = m. The revenue of both
strategies depends on the tax liability m and on the informative content of the signal. If m
is high enough, high-income taxpayers evade a low amount (they evade 1–m) and medium
income taxpayers evade a lot. Hence, it is more profitable to concentrate audit efforts on
uncovering medium income taxpayers, that is, auditing reports r = 0. Similarly, if m is low,
it is more convenient to increase the compliance of high-income taxpayers. Therefore, pmu
is as high as possible, and p0u keeps the level ensuring that high income taxpayers do not
have incentives to report r = 0.
As Lemma 2 implied, pmu £ p0u in every profile. This corresponds to the classical
result that the pressure can not be increasing with the report in order to discourage high-
income taxpayers to make the lowest reports. However, it is important to notice that, in
our model, this fact does not imply the actual audit probability to be non-increasing with
the income. To clarify this point, remember that p(i, r(i)) is the actual probability of
auditing taxpayer i in a particular profile. It is easy to check that, for a > 1/2, p(m, r(m)) >
p(0, r(0)) in every profile except in C (where p(m, r(m)) > p(0, r(0)) only for high enough
a and b). In particular, in profile E, p(m, r(m)) > p(0, r(0)) is compatible with pr(m)u = pmu
< p0u. Also, p(1, r(1)) > p(m, r(m)) in profiles A and C. Therefore, when the tax
administration makes use of signals to direct its audit strategy, it is possible to see an audit
probability increasing with the income in a situation in which the tax administration
commits to its audit strategy.
To characterize the optimal audit policy, we write the tax authority revenue (the
sum of the voluntary compliance plus taxes and penalties collected after the audit) as a
function of the parameters of the model.
                                               
12 Notice that (3 – 2a) / (4 – 2a) is a decreasing function of a that takes values in the interval (1/2,
2/3).14
Corollary 1. The total expected ex-post collection by the tax authority as a function of
the behavior induced on the taxpayers and the enforcement tools are:
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It is easy to check that the functions MK are increasing in m and a, for K = A, B, C,
D, E. That is, expected revenue always increases both with the tax liability and with the
informational content of the signal.
Once we have calculated the optimal policy and revenues for each possible
behavior profile, we now look at the choice of which profile is preferred by the tax
authority. Lemma 4 states that only Profile A is sustainable for low b. When b increases,
the tax authority can induce other taxpayers' behaviors. Proposition 4 states the optimal
choice by the tax authority.
Proposition 1.
 (a) Profile A is optimal if b < min{bB, bC}.
(b) Profile B is optimal if b ˛ [bB, bD) and m < m°(b) for b ‡ bC.
(c) Profile C is optimal if b ˛ [bC, bE) and m ‡ m°(b).
(d) Profile D is optimal if b ˛ [bD, bE) and m < m°(b).
(e) Profile E is optimal if b ‡ bE.15
Where m°(b) is an increasing (and discontinuous at the point b = bD) function defined in
the interval [bC, bE).
Before explaining the characteristics of the optimal auditing policy and the
taxpayers’ behavior, we present the extreme cases. The benchmark, i.e., the case where no
signal is available, corresponds to the situation with a = 1/2, that is represented in Figure
1. In this case, by Lemma 5 and Proposition 1, the optimal audit policy is the following
function of m: for m < 1/2, the optimal policy lies in Profile A (r(m) = 0, r(1) = 0) until the
budget is high enough (formally, b ‡ (2/3) m)  to reach Profile B (r(m) = 0, r(1) = m); for
m > 1/2, the optimal audit policy lies in Profile A until the budget (b ‡ 1/3) allows to reach
Profile C (r(m) = m, r(1) = m). In both cases, the optimal policy for b ‡ 2/3 is Profile E.
 [Insert Figure 1 about here]
Note that compliance in the benchmark is always increasing on b for every group of
taxpayers. Also, in this case, the tax authority does not audit medium-income reports
unless there is no fraudulent taxpayer reporting r = 0.
13 This is so because a change in the
audit probability affects all taxpayers in the same way.
In the other extreme case, that is, when a = 1, low-income taxpayers never have
associated the signal “up”. Therefore, Profile C can be reached with a zero budget. Hence,
starting with a low or zero budget, the optimal policy consists in inducing medium and
high-income taxpayers to report m (formally, r(m) = m, r(1) = m), until  b is high enough
to allow full compliance.
The results presented in Proposition 1 are summarized in Figure 2.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
We now comment on the most interesting properties of the optimal auditing policy and the
induced taxpayers’ behavior, postponing to the next section the discussion about
progressivity. The first important fact is that, when signals are available, it is not necessarily
true that taxpayers’ compliance increases with b. For intermediate values of m, the optimal
                                               
13 This property does not hold in Profiles B (b) and D, profiles that are sometimes optimal when
signals are available.16
policy moves from Profile C to Profile D as b goes from levels lower than bD to levels higher
than bD. This change in profile implies that medium-income taxpayers decrease their report
(they report r(m) = m in Profile C while they report r(m) = 0 in Profile D), and they lower
their compliance as the enforcement strength increases. Therefore, in our framework, an
increase in the budget, a decrease in the audit cost, or an increase in the penalty level may
lead to a lower compliance by a group of taxpayers. The reason for this property is that,
when the enforcement strength is lower than bD and m is high enough, inducing both groups
of taxpayers to report r = m is optimal. On the other hand, for low values of m, it is
worthwhile for the tax authority to induce truthful revelation by high-income taxpayers as
soon as the enforcement tools allows it (i.e., when the enforcement strength is higher than
bD). The cheapest way to induce this behavior is to audit with probability p = 1/[a(1+p)] the
taxpayers reporting either r = 0 or r = m. But, when the signal is valuable (i.e., when a >
1/2), this probability is not high enough for the medium-income taxpayers to report honestly,
hence r(m) = 0. Consequently, for intermediate values of m, medium-income taxpayers may
perceive a lower audit pressure as b increases. Although this is an interesting result, we
suspect that it might be due to the discrete nature of our model.
Some other characteristics of Figure 2 can be explained. When the medium level of
tax liability m is high, the tax authority is more concerned by evasion of medium-income
taxpayers than by inducing full compliance of high-income taxpayers. Therefore, Profile D
is never optimal. On the contrary, when m is low, the tax authority prefers devoting
resources to induce high income taxpayers to pay as much as possible (through penalties)
than inducing them to report m. Therefore Profile C is never optimal.
6.- AUDITING AND PROGRESSIVITY
From a normative point of view, a very important aspect of the audit policy is the
relationship between progressivity of the nominal taxes and progressivity of the effective
taxes. Cremer et al (1990), Sánchez and Sobel (1993), Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo
(1997), and Chandler and Wilde (1998), among others, point out that effective taxes tend
to be more regressive than nominal ones. The reason for this result is that the possibilities
for underreporting increase with the level of income. The optimal auditing policy must first17
devote resources to the audit of low reports, since this is the most profitable deviation for
any taxpayer. But then, low-income taxpayers do not have any room for underreporting,
while high-income taxpayers are not fully compliant since they can report medium incomes
not audited.
The previous argument is less clear-cut when a signal independent of the report but
correlated with true income is available. In this case, the same report by two different
taxpayers triggers two different audit pressures since a higher income involves a higher
probability of inducing a signal “up”. We claim that, in some sense, the existence of the
signal helps the progressivity of the effective tax scheme.
To explain our previous claim, let us denote by T(i) the expected payment (taxes
plus fines) made by a taxpayer with true tax liability i facing the optimal audit policy. Also,
denote by g(i) the “burden ratio” of this taxpayer, i.e., g(i) = T(i)/i. In the literature of
optimal auditing without signals, g(i) is a function weakly decreasing in i. For example, in
Sánchez and Sobel (1993), g(i) = 1 for every i < a, where a is a certain cut-off value, and
g(i) = a/i  for i ‡ a (strictly decreasing in i). Hence, effective taxes are more regressive
than nominal ones.
 In our simple model, with only three income levels, the relevant comparison is
between g(1) and g(m). In the benchmark, with a = 1/2, only three profiles are possible as
a function of m. For m < 1/2, the optimal policy either lies in Profile A, with g(1) = g(m) =
b; or in Profile B, with g(1) = g(m) < 1; or in Profile E, with g(1) = g(m) = 1. For m > 1/2,
as b increases, the induced behavior goes from Profile A, to Profile C, where g(1) < g(m)
= 1 and to Profile E. Hence, g(i) is weakly decreasing. However, the result may change if
a > 1/2. In Profile A and in Profile B, for a > 1/2, it can be checked that 1 > g(1) > g(m).
In addition, Profile D can be optimal, and there g(1) = 1 > g(m). Therefore, considering
the effective compliance of high and medium-income taxpayers, effective taxes may be
more progressive than nominal taxes.
The previous conclusion is reinforced if we look at the behavior of the ratio
g(1)/g(m) in each profile as a  changes. In profiles A, B, and C this ratio increases with a.
Hence progressivity increases with a. Only in Profile D, g(1)/g(m) decreases with a. This
is reasonable since in this profile high income taxpayers fully comply g(1) = 1, so increases18
in a  allows to devote more resources to improve compliance by medium-income
taxpayers, who are the only evaders.
We also know that changes in a affect the minimum enforcement strength needed
to reach each profile. Sometimes, an increase in a allows going from one profile to
another in the direction of increasing progressivity. For example, an increase in a can
drive the optimal audit from Profile C to Profile D. However, in other circumstances,
increases in a may lead to higher compliance to every taxpayer but towards a more
regressive induced behavior. This happens, for example, when the increase in a allows to
go from Profile A to Profile C.
Scotchmer (1987) also shows that the use of information other than the reported
income can lead to effective taxes more progressive than stipulated by the tax code. In her
paper, the information that the tax authority holds allows it to define different taxpayers'
audit classes. The tax authority finds it lucrative to condition the probability of audit on
audit class, as well as on reported income. Each taxpayer is aware of the information in
hands of the administration, and hence of the income class he/she belongs to. Within an
income class, the tax authority will audit taxpayers with low income reports with higher
probability than it audits high-report taxpayers, and this introduces a regressive bias in the
effective tax code. On the other hand, given that the audit probability depends on the audit
class, the regressive bias is of limited importance if the audit class is a good predictor of
true income. Effective taxes can actually more progressive than nominal taxes. We think
that our analysis is complementary to Scotchmer (1987)'s. They both show that acquiring
information (signals) about taxpayers can help to direct the audit not only to improve
compliance but also to reduce the regressive bias due to the possibility of fraud.
7.- CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present a model of optimal tax auditing that takes into account
the existence of external signals correlated with taxpayers’ true income. The limitations of
our exercise are clear. First, it suffers from the same criticisms as the papers on optimal
auditing that follows the principal-agent approach: we assume commitment by the tax19
authority to an audit policy that is not ex-post optimal, taxpayers are assumed to be risk
neutral, the taxpayers income is exogenous, and the audit technology is particular.
Second, we carry out the analysis in a framework with only three possible incomes.
Moreover, most of the results are obtained under that assumption that the population is
homogeneously distributed over the set of incomes. We can extend the analysis to more
general distributions of the population of taxpayers and the results are qualitatively the
same. However, it is clear that we are far from being able to provide a general analysis of
tax compliance in the presence of signals. The technical difficulties associated to a general
model become apparent in one takes into account the technical complication of the model
without signals and the additional difficulty added by signals, which imply that a given
audit probability induces different pressures depending on the taxpayers’ true income.
In spite of the previous limitations, we think that the analysis carried out here help
to enlighten some relevant positive and normative aspects of the optimal auditing policy
and the taxpayers’ compliance behavior. Two results obtained in the literature without
signals seem robust to the introduction of them. On the one hand, facing the optimal audit
policy, a taxpayer does not suffer higher audit pressure as he/she increases his/her report.
On the other hand, reports are weakly increasing with income. However, the result that
tax compliance is (weakly) increasing in the budget for every taxpayer does not seem to be
robust to the introduction of signals. Moreover, the actual audit probability can be
increasing with the income when the tax administration makes use of signals to direct its
audit strategy.
A more interesting result from a normative point of view is the relationship
between the informational content of the signal and the progressivity of effective taxes.
Our analysis shows that effective taxes may be more progressive than nominal ones.
Moreover, it suggests that effective progressivity, in general, increases with the
informational content of the signal. This is an appealing property that, we think, deserves
further research. A tax authority could be interested in acquiring signals about taxpayers
(even if this is costly), not only because this increases tax revenues, but also because it
improves the progressivity of the effective tax system.20
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APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1. If p(1, m) > 1 / (1+p), then r(1) „ m, so no penalty is collected
through the audit of the returns that report r = m. This is also true for p(1, m) = 1 / (1+p),
at a lower or equal cost. Similarly, if Min {p(1, 0), p(m, 0)} > 1 / (1+p), there will be no
evader reporting r = 0. The behavior of every taxpayer and the collected taxes and
penalties will be the same at lower auditing cost if the tax authority decreases p0d and/or
p0u until the strict inequality becomes an equality.   Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2. If p(1, m) > p(1, 0), then there are two possibilities. The first
possibility is that both sides of the equation are higher or equal than 1 / (1+p), so r(1) = 1,
and then setting p(1, m) = 1/(1+p) induces the same behavior at a lower or equal cost. The
second possibility is that p(1, 0) < 1 / (1+p), then [1 / (1+p)] m + p(1, m) (1–m) > p(1, 0),
which implies that (4) is not satisfied, and so r(1) = 0. Consequently, it is still possible to
decrease p(1, m) until the inequality becomes equality, the taxpayers’ behavior is not
altered by the change and the auditing cost is lower or equal. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3. Suppose that some taxpayers are reporting r, for r = 0, m. We denote
by lr the rate of taxpayers whose signal is “up” among the taxpayers reporting r.
Similarly, we denote by mr the rate of taxpayers whose signal is “up” among the taxpayers
earning an income level strictly higher than r and reporting r. Notice that ar £ lr £ mr.
For i = m, suppose that pmd > 0 and pmu < 1. We show that we can change the policy not
altering taxpayers’ revenue and without increasing the auditing cost. Consider an increase
in pmu and a decrease in pmd so that p(1, m) does not change. That is, Dpmu = d > 0 and
Dpmd = – (a1/(1–a1)) d (with d small enough). High-income taxpayers’ behavior and the
revenue from these taxpayers do not change with the new policy, since p(1, m) is the
same. On the other hand, the change in costs is proportional to:
l mDpmu + (1 - l m)Dpmd = lm -
a1
(1 - a1)
(1 - l m)
Ø 
º  Œ 
ø 
ß  œ  d £ 0
since, as it is easy to see, lm £ a1. Notice that we can go on with such changes in the
policy until either pmu = 1 or pmd = 0.22
For i = 0, suppose that p0d > 0 and p0u < 1. We distinguish between three possibilities:
(a) Suppose that r(1) „ 0. Then, consider an increase in p0u and a decrease in p0d
so that p(m,0) does not change. That is, Dp0u = d > 0 and Dp0d = – (am/(1–am)) d (with d
small enough). Notice that p(1,0) does not decrease with the change, given that a1 ‡ am:
Dp(1,0) = a1Dp0u +(1- a1 )Dp0d = a1 -
a m
(1 - am )
(1 - a1 )
Ø 
º  Œ 
ø 
ß  œ  d ‡ 0.
This implies that high-income taxpayers keep not reporting r = m after the change, i.e.,
they do not change their behavior. Also, the behavior of, and the revenues from, medium-
income taxpayers is the same. Finally, the change in cost of the auditing policy is
proportional to:
l 0Dp0u + (1- l 0 )Dp0 d = l 0 -
am
(1 - am )
(1 - l0 )
Ø 
º  Œ 
ø 
ß  œ  d £ 0
since l0 £ am, given that r(1) „ 0. Therefore, the change in the policy is not damaging.
Notice that we can proceed until either p0u = 1 or p0d = 0.
(b) Suppose that r(1) = 0 and r(m) = 0. Then, consider an increase in p0u and a
decrease in p0d that keeps the revenues constant, i.e., Dp0u = d > 0 and Dp0d = – (m0/(1–
m0)) d. Notice, first, that since l0 £ m0, it is easy to show (using the same method as in
(iia)) that the auditing cost does not increase. Also, given that am £ m0 £ a1, p(1, 0) does
not decrease while p(m, 0) does not increase. Therefore, medium-income taxpayers will
not alter their behavior with the change. As to high-income taxpayers, there are two
possibilities. Either we can go on with the modification in the audit probabilities until p0u =
1 or p0d = 0, with high-income taxpayers reporting r = 0, and then it is proved. Or there is
a certain point at which they want to change their report to r’(1) = 1 or r’(1) = m.
Suppose that r’(1) = m (similarly for the other case). Denote by p’(1, 0) ‡ p(1, 0) the
auditing pressure such that high-income taxpayers are indifferent between reporting r = 0
and r = m, given the pressure p(1, m) on the reports r = m. We proceed with the increase
of p0u and the decrease of p0d until we reach p’(1, 0). A this point, high-income taxpayers
change their report, with the same revenue for the tax administration, since the taxpayers
are indifferent. Moreover, the cost of auditing these taxpayers does not increase, since23
p’(1, 0) ‡ p(1, m) if they are reporting r = m. Therefore, up to this point, the change in the
policy is not damaging. Once we have proceed with the change in the policy until we reach
p’(1, 0), we are in a situation as in (iia), and we can proceed as described there, until either
p0u = 1 or p0d = 0.
(c) Suppose that r(1) = 0 and r(m) = m. This means that p(m, 0) ‡ 1/(1+p). First,
decrease pmu and/or pmd until we reach a situation in which p’(1, m) is so low that high-
income taxpayers are indifferent between reporting r = 0 and r = m. If these taxpayers
prefer reporting r = 0 even for pmu = pmd = 0, then we fix p’(1, m) = 0. In both cases, p’(1,
m) £ p(1, 0). Second, increase p0u and decrease p0d so that p(m, 0) does not change, until
either p0u = 1 or p0d = 0. At the end of this process, p’(1, 0) ‡ p’(m, 0) = p(m, 0) ‡
1/(1+p). Therefore, high-income taxpayers will end up reporting r = m. In short, revenues
from high-income taxpayers do not decrease, since previous to the changes in p0u and p0d
high-income taxpayers were indifferent or preferred strictly reporting r = 0 than r = m; the
cost of auditing these consumers does not increase, since p’(1, m) £ p(1, 0); medium
income taxpayers keep reporting their true income, and do not suffer more auditing than
before; and low-income taxpayers suffer less or equal inspection, given that a0 £ am.
Therefore, the change in the policy is not damaging.Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4 and 5 and Corollary 1. For convenience, we present the proofs
together. We first proceed profile by profile.
Profile A: r(m) = 0, r(1) = 0. The only parameters that matters is p0u, the whole population
is reporting r = 0. Half of them receive the signal u. Then, with a budget B, the tax
authority can credibly commit to a probability: p0u = 2 B/c. The tax authority only collects
revenues through penalties, to the amount:  M A (B) =
1
3




The minimum amount of money needed to be in this profile is: BA = 0.
Profile B: r(m) = 0, r(1) = m. For the taxpayers to report according to this profile, the
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The minimum budget BB necessary to be in this profile corresponds to pmu = 0 and p0u = m
/ a (1+p). The number of taxpayers audited, because they are reporting r = 0 and their























Therefore, we can write the revenues as a function of p0u:






(1 + p)(1- m) +
1
6
m - (3 - 2a)(1 - m) [ ]p0u(1 + p).
Note that the revenue function is increasing (resp. decreasing) in p0u if and only if (4 – 2a)
m ‡ 3 – 2a (resp. (4 – 2a) m £ 3 – 2a). Therefore, the optimal audit policy depends upon
the value of m:
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Profile C: r(m) = m, r(1) = m. The audit probabilities that lead the taxpayers to send
































The minimum budget needed to be in profile C corresponds to pmu = 0 and p0u = 2 /








The optimal audit policy in this profile increases pmu as much as the budget allows for
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Given that no taxpayer is reporting m, pmu is free. Therefore, the minimum budget BD to







c . To calculate the maximum p0u possible with




















Profile E: r(m) = m, r(1) = 1. The optimal  audit is:p0u =
2
1 + p






The budget required and the revenue raised in this profile are:
BE =
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For the proof of Lemma 4 (ii) – (iv), note first that bE > bD if and only if 1 + 4a – 4a
2 > 3
– 2a, i.e., 2 (1–a) (1 – 2a) < 0, which is always the case for a ˛(1/2,1). They coincide for26
a =1/2 and a =1. Also, bD > bC if and only if 3 – 2a > 4 (1–a) a, i.e., 3 – 6a + 4a
2 > 0,
which always holds. Note that bD > bB is immediate. Finally, BC < BB if and only if 4 (1–a)
a < (3 – 2a) m. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1. We prove it through a series of claims.
(i) Profile A is not optimal if b ‡ min{bB,bC}.
MB – MA ‡ 
m + 2a
3 - (3 - 2a)m




º  Œ 
ø 
ß  œ –
(m + 2a)b
3
 ‡ 0 if and only if  b < 2a , which is
always true. Also, MC – MA > 0 if and only if b <
m(2 + 8a - 4a
2 ) - 4a(1 -a)
m(1 + 8a) - 4a(1- a)
” b°. For
our purposes, it is enough to prove that b° > bE when m ‡ 4a (1– a)/(3–2 a) (i.e., when
bC < bB), which is always true.
(ii) Profile E is optimal if b ‡ bE. The proof is straightforward.
(iii) Profile B is never optimal for b ‡ bC and m ‡ (3–2 a)/(4 – 2 a). MC ‡ MB for m ‡(3–
2 a)/ (4–2 a) if and only if (3–2a) [(1+6a –4a
2) m – 4a (1–a)] ‡ 3 b[(1+8a –4a
2) m –
2a (3–2a)]. The term multiplying b is positive for all m ‡ (3–2 a)/ (4–2 a). Hence, the
inequality is more difficult to hold the bigger is b. It can be checked that the inequality
holds for bD (looking at the expressions in Corollary 1, it is easy to see that MD > MB for
this range of m).
(iv) For m < (3–2a) / (4–2a), there is a function  ˜  b (m;a), increasing in m, such that MC ‡
MB  if and only if b ‡  ˜  b (m;a).
MC ‡ MB for m < (3–2a) / (4–2a)  if and only if  X(m, a) ‡ Y(m, a) b, where
Y(m, a) = –3(1–m) [4a (1–a) – m(1+8a –4a
2)] and






X(m, a) < Y(m, a) for m ˛ [0, (3–2a) / (4–2a)] and both functions coincide at the
extreme values of m. For m = 0 both are negative. For m = (3–2a) / (4–2a) both are
positive. Consequently, if Y(m, a) < 0, then both functions are negative, X(m, a) / Y(m, a)
> 1, and the condition does not hold. When Y(m, a) > 0 and X(m, a) < 0, the condition
holds. Finally, for Y(m, a) > 0 and X(m, a) > 0, the condition can be written as b <
X(m, a) / Y(m, a). After tedious calculations, it can be shown that X(m, a) / Y(m, a) is
increasing in m. Hence, for low values of m, Profile B is superior. Defining X(m, a) /
Y(m, a) as  ˜  b (m;a) we have proven the claim (given that this function is increasing in m).
(v) Profile B is never optimal for b ‡ bD. It is straightforward that MD ‡ MB for m ‡  (3–
2a) / (4–2a). MD ‡ MB for m < (3–2a) / (4–2a)  if and only if  6 a [3–2 a –2 (2 – a) m] b
< (3 – 2 a)(3 – 3 m – m
2). The term multiplying b is positive for all m < (3–2a) / (4–2a).
Hence, the inequality is more difficult to hold the bigger is b. After tedious calculations, it
can be checked that the inequality holds for bE.
(vi) There is a function  ˆ  b (m;a), increasing in m, such that MC > MD iff b >  ˆ  b (m;a). MD ‡
MC if and only if b Z(m, a) ‡ W(m, a), where: Z(m, a) = 3 [m(1+8a –4a
2)– 2a (3–2a)]
and W(m, a) = (3–2a) [m(2+8a –4a
2) – 1 – 2a (3–2a)] . For m < 2a (3–2a)/ (1+8a –
4a
2), Z(m, a) and W(m, a) are negative. For bE the inequality holds. For m ˛ [2a (3–2a)/
(1+8a –4a
2), (1 + 2a (3–2a)/(2+8a –4a
2)], Z(m, a) is positive and W(m, a) negative and
the condition holds. For m > (1 + 2a (3–2a)/(2+8a –4a
2), Z(m, a) and W(m, a) are
positive. We define  ˆ  b (m;a) as  W(m, a) / Z(m, a), a function which is increasing in m,
and we obtain the result.
To conclude the proof of Proposition 1, we only have to define the function m°(b) from
[bC, bE) to [0, 1] as the inverse of the function  ˜  b (m;a) in the interval [bC, bD) and as the
inverse of  ˆ  b (m;a) for the levels of m in the interval [bD, bE). Q.E.D.28
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